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INTRODUCTION 
In this Court, as in the Court of Appeals, the 
defendants have misstated many of the facts of this case and 
have included references to wholly irrelevant facts in an 
effort to color the Court's analysis of the legal issues 
appropriately presented. These misrepresentations were 
previously identified to the defendants, so their repetition in 
this Court must be intentional. Appellant's Reply Brief (Court 
of Appeals) at pp. 1-6. While there are numerous errors which 
have been previously noted, four deserve specific mention here 
because they are used by the defendants as the basis for 
implying that Mr. Swayne isn't entitled to careful judicial 
consideration of his rights. 
The defendants repeatedly assert that Mr. Swayne wants 
to interfere with an adoption so he can "give" his daughter to 
his sister. (Respondents' Brief at 7, 33). This is entirely 
false. (II Trans, at pp. 28-29). They assert that Mr. Swayne 
refused to sign an acknowledgment of paternity while in the 
hospital. (Respondents' Brief at 5). This statement is 
refuted by the testimony of the mother herself. (I Trans, at 
pp. 11-12, 31-32). Defendants state that Mr. Swayne and 
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Ms. Paxman "discussed the possibility of placing the child for 
adoption." (Respondents' Brief at 4). They did not. In 
March, Penny said her parents wanted the child placed for 
adoption. Steven said it wasn't their decision to make and if 
Penny didn't want custody, he did. (I Trans, at p. 10). 
Defendants contend that Steven never offered to support his 
child financially. (Respondents' Brief at 4). Obviously, if 
he offered to accept custody of the child he was offering 
financial support. Furthermore, he certified his willingness 
to provide support when his child was less than two weeks old. 
(Exhibit 4 from Preliminary Injunction Hearing). 
The other errors in the respondents' brief relating to 
the number of visits by the child to Mr. Swayne's apartment 
(Swayne Depo. at 44-45), the mother's actual basis for 
relinquishing her own rights (I Trans, at 37), and the efforts 
she went to to hide her actions from Steven (I Trans, at 16), 
are all symptomatic of the distortions the defendants are 
willing to introduce into the record in an effort to persuade 
this Court that it is not important to hear the constitutional 
claims of a "22 year old single black man who lives in an 
apartment." (Respondents' Brief at 3). 
Mr. Swayne has been asserting his desire for custody 
of his infant daughter for two years and has assailed as 
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unconstitutional a statutory scheme which forecloses him from 
demonstrating his fitness. It is the defendants who seek to 
uphold a statute which forecloses a determination of 
Mr. Swayne's fitness, and yet in doing so they imply that he 
isn't worthy of having his parental rights protected. Such a 
suggestion highlights the fundamental unfairness of a statute 
which vests all unwed mothers with full parental rights, no 
matter how unfit they may be, and deprives all unwed fathers of 
such rights, without reference to their fitness, if they fail 
to file a piece of paper with the State before the mother 
renounces her parental rights by placing their child for 
adoption. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4 VIOLATES 
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
In evaluating an equal protection challenge to a 
statute which contains an express gender-based discrimination, 
this Court should closely scrutinize both the asserted 
objective of the statutory scheme and the relationship between 
the legislation's objective and the discriminatory means used 
to achieve that objective. The United States Supreme Court 
enunciated the appropriate analytical framework for gender 
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discrimination cases in Mississippi University for Women v. 
Hogjm, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). The Court indicated that 
the party seeking to uphold a statute that 
classifies individuals on the basis of their 
gender must carry the burden of showing an 
"exceedingly persuasive justification" for 
the classification. The burden is met only 
by showing at least that the classification 
serves "important governmental objectives 
and that the discriminatory means employed" 
are "substantially related to the 
achievement of those objectives." 
Although the test for determining the 
validity of a gender-based classification is 
straightforward, it must be applied free of 
fixed notions concerning the roles and 
abilities of males and females. Care must 
be taken in ascertaining whether the 
statutory objective itself reflects archaic 
and stereotypic notions. Thus, if the 
statutory objective is to exclude or 
"protect" members of one gender because they 
are presumed to suffer from an inherent 
handicap or to be innately inferior, the 
objective itself is illegitimate. 
458 U.S. 724-725 (citations omitted). 
Using this approach, it is questionable whether Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-30-4 actually has a legitimate objective. The 
discrimination against unwed fathers in the statute is 
apparently based upon the presumption this Court articulated in 
Wells v. Children's Aid Soc. of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984), 
that in the "common cases" unwed fathers neither desire nor are 
willing to assume the responsibilities of parenthood. 681 P.2d 
at 207. They are, therefore, excluded from having the 
automatic right to play a role in the decision about whether a 
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child of theirs should be adopted. This exclusion, which is 
seemingly based upon a presumption that unwed men inherently 
care less about their children than unwed women, may render the 
State's objective illegitimate. If the objective of the 
statute is to limit the father's parental rights in order to 
create more children available for adoption by "increasing 
numbers of infertile couples desiring to adopt," as the 
defendants imply, then it is unquestionably illegitimate. The 
State has absolutely no legitimate interest in terminating an 
unwed father's rights if he is fit to be a parent. See Stanley 
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
Even if the objective of the statute is legitimate, 
equal protection analysis requires the Court to 
determine whether the requisite direct, 
substantial relationship between objective 
and means is present. The purpose of 
requiring that close relationship is to 
assure that the validity of a classification 
is determined through reasoned analysis 
rather than through the mechanical 
application of traditional, often inaccurate, 
assumptions about the proper roles of men 
and women. The need for the requirement is 
amply revealed by reference to the broad 
range of statutes already invalidated by 
this Court, statutes that relied upon the 
simplistic, outdated assumption that gender 
could be used as a "proxy for other, more 
germane bases of classification,'1- to 
establish a link between objective and 
classification. 
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725-26 
(1982)(citations omitted). 
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The Court has indicated that this analysis is required 
because 
[r]ather than resting on meaningful 
considerations, statutes distributing 
benefits and burdens between the sexes in 
different ways likely reflect out-moded 
notions of the relative capabilities of men 
and women. 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985). 
Furthermore, in conducting this analysis in the 
instant case, the Court should strictly scrutinize the 
rationale offered in support of the connection between the 
gender discrimination and the State's objective, because the 
right which is being impacted is a fundamental right granted 
constitutional protection, as this Court noted in Wells, 
supra. When fundamental rights are infringed upon, the 
Equal Protection Clause mandates that the 
legislation be finely tailored to serve 
substantial state interests, and the 
justification offered for any distinction it 
draws must be carefully scrutinized. 
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980). 
To uphold the discriminatory scheme "the Court must 
determine [that] the exclusions are necessary to promote a 
compelling state interest." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 
337 (1972). See also, Mountain Fuel Supply v. Salt Lake City, 
752 P.2d 884, 888 n.3 (Utah 1988). 
It is respectfully submitted that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-4 has not previously been subjected to this type of 
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analysis. While the statute was upheld by this Court in Ellis 
v. Social Services Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980), the Court did not 
articulate the standard by which the Equal Protection review 
was conducted. In Wells v. Childrens Aid Soc. of Utah, 681 
P.2d 199 (Utah 1984), the Court suggested that Ellis involved a 
rational basis analysis by noting that 
implicit in that decision was the holding 
that there are reasonable bases for the 
classification in the statute. . .and that 
these classifications are reasonably 
calculated to serve a proper governmental 
objective. 
681 P.2d at 204. 
As demonstrated above, far more is required to 
validate a statutory scheme which makes a gender distinction 
impacting on a fundamental right. It is true that in analyzing 
the statute under a Due Process challenge this Court 
indicated that 
[i]n view of the compelling state interest 
in the summary determination prescribed in 
the statute and of the fact that the 
statutory terms are narrowly tailored to 
achieve the basic statutory purpose, we hold 
[that the statute's provisions] are facially 
valid under the Due Process Clause. . . 
681 P.2d at 207. 
It is respectfully submitted that what is missing from 
this analysis is any justification for imposing a burden on all 
unwed fathers which is imposed on no unwed mothers. In the 
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equal protection context it is not enough to demonstrate that 
the statute advances a compelling state interest. It must be 
established that the gender discrimination used to advance the 
State interest is necessary to accomplishing the State's 
objective. This is where the Utah statute fails the equal 
protection test. 
It has been repeatedly noted that the State has a 
strong interest in "ascertaining within a very short time of 
birth whether the biological parents (or either of them) are 
going to assert their constitutional rights and fulfill their 
corresponding responsibilities, or whether adoptive parents 
must be substituted." Wells, supra, at 203. In what way is 
this objective served by exempting all unwed mothers from the 
statutory procedure used to identify such parents? If the 
State has an interest in determining the intent of the 
biological parents (or either of them), that interest is 
manifestly just as strong in knowing the mother's intent as the 
father's. What is it that makes it necessary to place an 
additional burden on the father? 
It has been suggested that the burden is justified 
because the identity or location of the father may be unknown. 
This rationale justifies legislative distinctions between 
parents whose identity and location are known and those whose 
are not, but it does not make it necessary to draw the line on 
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the basis of sex only. A statute which is "narrowly tailored" 
to achieve a valid objective simply would not lump known and 
identified fathers into the same class as unknown or unlocated 
fathers if the true objective was to deal with a problem only 
presented by the latter class. 
The burdens of the statute aren't drawn on lines 
involving the State's "knowledge" of the identity, location or 
intent of the parents, they are drawn on the basis of gender 
alone. The statute avoids using the "germane bases" for 
classification and substitutes sex instead. This is precisely 
the kind of gender-based discrimination the United States 
Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected under an equal protection 
analysis because the sex differentiation is not fundamental to 
the objective identified as the goal of the statute. 
Furthermore, the fact that an unwed father can avoid 
the discriminatory effect of the statute by filing an 
acknowledgment of paternity does not save the statute. In 
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981), the Court struck 
down a Louisiana law which allowed a husband, but not a wife, 
to unilaterally sell or encumber jointly held property. On 
appeal, it was argued that because the wife had a right to file 
a notice which would deprive her husband of this unilateral 
power, having failed to do so she was the "architect of her own 
predicament" and should not be heard to complain of the 
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statute's discrimination. The Court summarily rejected this 
contention and noted that 
the "absence of an insurmountable barrier" 
will not redeem an otherwise discriminatory 
law. Instead the burden remains on the 
party seeking to uphold a statute that 
expressly discriminates on the basis of sex 
to advance an "exceedingly persuasive 
justification" for the challenged 
classification. 
450 U.S. at 461. 
In this action the defendants have attempted to 
justify the distinction drawn in the statute solely on the 
basis of the fact that the mother gives birth to the child and 
the father does not. This fact, they argue, means that the 
mother has a "substantial relationship with the child from the 
moment of its birth." Respondent's Brief at p. 28. Ironically, 
in the very next paragraph of their brief the defendants quote 
language from the United States Supreme Court which repudiates 
this notion. "Parental rights do not spring full-blown from 
the biological connection between parent and child. They 
require relationships more enduring." Lehr v. Robertson, 463 
U.S. 248, 260-61 (1983) . 
There can be little question that Utah's statutory 
scheme is the product of an assumption that all mothers can be 
trusted to endeavor to "do the right thing" for their children, 
whereas unwed fathers will be motivated only by self-interest 
and not consider the well-being of their offspring. The first 
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premise of this assumption is the variety of "romantic 
paternalism" referred to by the Supreme Court in Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973). The second prong of the 
assumption suffers from the "over- inclusiveness" condemned by 
this Court in Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 121 (Utah 1986). In 
short, a parent's rights in his (or her) relationship with a 
child should be determined on the basis "function-related 
factors," not sexual stereotypes. 
The easiest way to comprehend the invidious nature of 
the discrimination contained in the statute is by examining the 
argument made by the defendants in their brief at Point II, 
section D. This is where they assert that Mr. Swayne doesn't 
deserve to have his parental rights protected because he hasn't 
established that he is a willing father. 
Defendants begin this presentation with a false 
premise. They contend that a mother's rights with regard to an 
illegitimate child are determined by whether she relinquishes 
custody of her child. This is untrue. A mother's rights are 
fully vested even if she places custody of the child with 
someone else (her sister, for example) and leaves the state. 
Her rights remain intact until formally terminated by judicial 
decree after a hearing on the merits. If, during a period of 
abandonment by the mother, the unwed father had custody of the 
child and made the considered decision that the child would be 
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best served by a prompt adoption, he could not accomplish this 
result by placing the child with an adoption agency. No amount 
of "mature love and concern for the child's best interests and 
lifetime care" (Respondent's Brief at p. 33) on the part of the 
father could override the mother's vested parental rights. 
Next, the defendants denigrate the commitment shown by 
Mr. Swayne to his child. Without belaboring the factual 
misrepresentations contained in the brief, plaintiff submits 
virtually every "fact" to which defendants point to demonstrate 
why Mr. Swayne's rights are not deserving of protection is 
equally applicable to the mother whose "substantial 
relationship" with the child they contend was established at 
the moment of her birth. There is nothing in the record to 
suggest that Ms. Paxman paid any expense of childbirth or 
subsequent care of her infant daughter. She did not file a 
notice of her willingness to support her child. There is no 
evidence to suggest she ever offered to marry the father. She 
was not sexually chaste. She evidenced no desire to live with 
the child and, in fact, agreed to "give" her not to close 
family members but to strangers. 
Under Utah's statute, Steven Swayne is accorded less 
protection of his parental rights than the mother of his child 
because he is the same sex as a class of fathers to which he 
does not belong. Because this gender-based discrimination 
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adversely impacts a fundamental right, federal equal protection 
principles mandate that the relationship between the 
discrimination and the statute's objective be strictly 
scrutinized and, if the gender-based discrimination is not 
necessary to achieve the statute's objective, it must be 
invalidated. There is clearly a less restrictive alternative 
for dealing with the problems presented by unidentified or 
unlocated unwed fathers than by burdening the constitutionally 
protected rights of all unwed fathers. 
Because the State could deal with the problem 
presented by some unwed fathers without resort to an overly 
inclusive gender classification, the statute is violative of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, 
generally, Condemarin v. University Hospital, P.2d , 107 
UAR 5, 21 (Utah 1989)(Zimmerman, J. concurring). 
POINT II. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4 IS VIOLATIVE 
OF ART. I § 24 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Contrary to the assertion of the defendants, 
Mr. Swayne has suggested both to this Court and the Court of 
Appeals a reason why the "equal protection" guarantee of the 
Utah Constitution requires a more stringent level of scrutiny 
than the Fourteenth Amendment dictates in gender discrimination 
cases. As pointed out to the Court of Appeals (see Reply Brief 
of Appellant, p. 13), Art. IV § 1 of the Utah Constitution 
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makes gender a suspect classification and would warrant 
application of strict scrutiny review even if this Court had 
not indicated that an unwed father's parental rights are 
fundamental rights. Strict scrutiny would be appropriate, 
therefore, even if the Court felt that the parental rights of 
an unwed father of a newborn were not entitled to constitutional 
protection, as the Court of Appeals held. Because a fundamental 
right is involved, strict scrutiny is mandated under both the 
federal and state constitutional equal protection provisions. 
POINT III. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4 VIOLATES THE 
DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF BOTH THE UTAH 
AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
The provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4(3) create 
an irrebuttable presumption that an unwed father who doesn't 
file an acknowledgment of paternity prior to the mother's 
release of the child has abandoned his child and he is 
permanently foreclosed from thereafter seeking to establish his 
parental rights. In Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973) 
the United States Supreme Court stated that "permanent 
irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored under the 
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment." In 
LaFleur v. Cleveland Board of Education, 414 U.S. 632, 646 
(1974), the Court held that an irrebuttable presumption which 
was neither "necessarily [nor] universally true" is violative 
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of the Due Process Clause. In LaFleur, the Court also 
emphasized the actual holding of Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 
645 (1972). It noted that in Stanley the Court 
held that the State could not conclusively 
presume any particular unmarried father was 
unfit to raise his child; the Due Process 
Clause required a more individualized 
determination. 
414 U.S. at 645. 
It doesn't change the analysis of this issue to say 
that the statute "deems" failure to file to be a surrender of 
rights as opposed to an abandonment of the child. The 
substantive due process question presented is whether the 
legislatively mandated conclusion (that the father has no 
interest in his parental rights) flows as a matter of course 
from the fact established (that the filing wasn't effected 
before the mother released the child). As the United States 
Supreme Court decisions demonstrate, due process is a 
constitutional limitation on the legislature's ability to 
"deem" one status to be the equivalent of another. Pregnancy 
cannot be "deemed" to be the equivalent of disability; being 
unmarried cannot be "deemed" the equivalent of being unfit to 
be a parent; and failure to file an unknown document cannot 
be "deemed" to be the equivalent of intending to abandon 
parental rights. 
Contrary to the assertion of the defendants, plaintiff 
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does not concede the facial constitutionality of the statute. 
Plaintiff admits that this Court has held it to be facially 
constitutional under a due process analysis. It is for this 
reason that plaintiff also focuses on the application of the 
statute to the facts of this case to demonstrate the 
fundamental unfairness of the statute's parental rights 
termination provision as applied to Mr. Swayne. 
The defendants respond to both the due process and 
equal protection arguments by asserting that Mr. Swayne's 
rights are not entitled to protection because he had no 
substantial relationship with his child. This argument ignores 
the issue addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Lehr 
v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), which is whether the statute 
in question adequately protects an unwed father's opportunity 
to develop his parental relationship. Unlike the statute at 
issue in Lehr, which would have protected Mr. Swayne's 
opportunity interest, Utah's statute permits only one method of 
establishing parental interests in unwed fathers and allows for 
termination of their rights six months before their children 
are even eligible for adoption. It forecloses an unwed father 
from exercising his opportunity interest when the child is days 
(or even hours) old. A statute which doesn't allow a 
"reasonable" opportunity to develop the parental relationship 
doesn't comport with due process. "Absent abandonment of his 
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interest, a state may not deny a biological father a reasonable 
opportunity to establish a relationship with his child." In re 
Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459, 462 (Ga. 1987). As stated by 
Justice Krivosha in Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Services 
Bureau, 385 N.W.2d 448 (Neb. 1986), 
how can this father, or any father,. . . 
live with the child, nurture it, and support 
it if his rights to the child can be 
terminated during the time that the mother 
and child are in the hospital and before he 
is afforded any opportunity to establish 
those necessary ties? 
385 N.W.2d at 455 (Krivosha, J., dissenting). 
Mr. Swayne respectfully submits that establishing an 
"impossibility" standard as a substitute for one based on 
"reasonable opportunity" does not cure the due process 
deficiency of the statute. A father who is in the process of 
developing a relationship with his child should not see his 
opportunity forfeited because it was not physically impossible 
for him to file a document of which he was unaware to protect 
rights which he didn't know were being challenged. 
POINT IV. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 0-4 MAKES THE 
DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT "STATE ACTION" FOR 
THE PURPOSES OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
The issue of whether the defendants acted under the 
color of state law for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is 
purely a question of federal law. See Marshall v. Sawyer, 
301 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962). The Federal District Court for 
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the District of Utah has held, under the facts of this case, 
that the defendants acted under color of state law within the 
meaning of the statute. See Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 
670 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1987). While that ruling is not 
technically the law of the case, Judge Greene's opinion should 
be adopted by this Court because it correctly notes that only 
the state can terminate parental rights and Utah's statute 
invests private parties with the power to effect such a 
termination of the rights of an unwed father. The defendants, 
therefore, have been invested by the statute with a power 
reserved for the sovereign. When they exercise this power they 
are engaging in an action only the state can take and are, 
therefore, properly characterized as "state actors." 
The defendants' analysis of this issue is flawed 
because they seek to characterize this as an adoption case, 
arguing that adoption has not historically been viewed as an 
exclusive function of the state. This is not an adoption 
case. It is a challenge to the constitutionality of Utah's 
statutory scheme mandating the termination of the parental 
rights of certain unwed fathers. Parental rights termination 
is exclusively a state prerogative and can only be effected 
under color of state law. 
The defendants' suggestion that § 78-30-4 "renders 
parental rights of unwed father no more subject to termination 
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POINT V. 
ADOPTION BY ACKNOWLEDGMENT HAS BEEN 
RAISED IN EVERY COURT WHICH HAS 
CONSIDERED THIS CASE 
The simplest response to the defendants' erroneous 
assertion that the issue of adoption by acknowledgment has been 
raised for the first time in this Court is to quote from their 
memorandum filed with the Third District Court: 
Plaintiff claims to have adopted the child 
by acknowledgment pursuant to section 
78-30-12. 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
at p. 12 n.2. This issue was briefed both in the trial Court 
and the Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Appellant's Brief at pp. 
15-18; Petition for Rehearing at pp. 2-5. The defendants' 
contention to the contrary is one more example of their efforts 
to avoid having this Court deal with the issues on the merits. 
In addressing the merits of the adoption by 
acknowledgment question the defendants make the conclusory 
assertion that Mr. Swayne "[did] not come close" to adoption by 
acknowledgment without citation to any authority. They imply 
that plaintiff's two visits with his daughter don't constitute 
receipt of the child into the father's family, even though this 
Court has acknowledged that it is 
generally held that a father can satisfy the 
receiving requirement by accepting the child 
into his home for occasional brief visits. 
Slade v. Dennis, 594 P.2d 898, 900 (Utah 1979). 
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CONCLUSION 
Steven Swayne's parental rights were terminated not 
because he lacked sincere concern for his daughter but rather 
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because the mother of his child was persuaded by her parents 
that she should give up the baby. A statute which vests unwed 
mothers with the right to decide about adoption but which does 
not accord the same right to unwed fathers who have 
demonstrated a desire to form a true parental relationship is 
fundamentally unfair. The defendants' efforts to lead this 
Court to believe that Steven Swayne is simply a disinterested 
interloper who is attempting to thwart an adoption but not to 
establish a true parental relationship with his daughter 
underscores the unfairness of the statute and its inequality in 
the treatment of men and women. While the defendants assert 
that Mr. Swayne never demonstrated concern for his child, the 
mother of the child knew this to be false. She realized the 
day after she signed the release, after seeing Steven and his 
daughter together, that she had been wrong to cause his rights 
to be terminated. 
After seeing Steven that day, that's when I 
started thinking that I wasn't fair to 
Steven because I had known that we was 
concerned with the baby. I just felt that 
he had no concern for me. So later that 
night, Tuesday night, I was starting to 
realize that I should have thought through a 
little more of what I had done, and we 
wouldn't be here today. 
(I. Trans, at 43-44). 
Utah's statute precluded Steven Swayne from 
participating in the decision of whether his baby was going to 
be placed for adoption and vested full authority for that 
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